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Introduction	  
	  Economic	   growth	   data	   does	   not	   show	   how	   such	   growth	  was	   achieved.	  Was	   it	  based	   on	   income	   growth	   and	   consumption	   spending	   levels	   or	  was	   it	   based	   on	  borrowings	  to	  extend	  the	  income	  levels?	  	  The	  question	  is	  vital	  for	  deciding	  which	  economic	  tools	  work	  best	  for	  correcting	  imbalances.	   The	   main	   imbalances	   are	   based	   on	   the	   developments	   of	   two	   key	  variables:	   the	   level	   of	   income	   growth	   and	   the	   level	   of	   debt	   incurred	   to	   buy	  homes,	  consumer	  goods	  and	  education.	  	  The	   U.S.	   Balance	   Sheet	   of	   Households	   and	   Nonprofit	   Organizations1	  sums	   up,	  very	   succinctly,	   the	   wealth	   position	   of	   households	   through	   various	   asset	   and	  liability	   classes.	   	   What	   a	   single	   balance	   sheet	   cannot	   show	   is	   how	   assets,	  liabilities,	   incomes	   and	   net	   worth	   interact.	   Making	   use	   of	   historical	   balance	  sheets	  provide	  a	  better	  insight.	  	  For	  instance	  in	  1997,	  the	  combined	  liabilities	  of	  home	  mortgages	  and	  consumer	  credits	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  disposable	  personal	  income	  stood	  at	  82.9%.	  By	  the	  end	  of	   2006	   this	   percentage	   had	   increased	   to	   123.7%.	   Per	   end	   of	   2010	   this	  percentage	  had	  dropped	  to	  111.6%,	  only	  to	  drop	  even	  further	  to	  96.4%	  per	  end	  of	  2014.	  Student	  loans	  have	  not	  been	  included	  in	  these	  figures.	  	  If	  debts	  grow	  faster	  than	  income	  levels,	  one	  may	  define	  such	  a	  period	  as	  one	  of	  overfunding	   and,	  when	  debts	   grow	  slower	   than	   incomes,	   underfunding	  occurs.	  Overfunding	   took	   place	   in	   the	   U.S.	   from	   1998-­‐2007	   and	   underfunding	   from	  2008-­‐2014.	  Relative	  positions	  are	   important,	  but	   the	  absolute	   level	  of	   incomes	  growth	  is	  essential.	  During	  the	  overfunding	  period	  average	  income	  levels	  had	  a	  tendency	   to	   grow	   slightly	   faster	   than	   the	   CPI	   level,	   while	   during	   the	  underfunding	   period	   average	   income	   growth	   lagged	   behind	   the	   CPI	   inflation	  levels.	  Finally,	   the	  spread	  of	   income	  levels	  around	  the	  average	   is	   important.	  Do	  the	  lower	  income	  groups	  benefit	  less	  from	  economic	  growth	  than	  the	  better	  off?	  	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  set	  out	  why	  some	  new	  economic	  tools	  are	  needed	  to	  correct	  imbalances.	  They	  are:	  (i)	  the	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  method	  (EGIM);	  (ii)	  the	  use	  of	  some	  pension	  fund	  savings	  and	  (iii)	  the	  use	  of	  home	  equity,	  which	  is	  the	  most	  illiquid	  of	  all	  savings.	  All	  three	  tools	  are	  for	  temporary	  use	  only.	  	  In	   the	  U.S.	   at	  2014	  year-­‐end,	  pension	  entitlements	  stood	  at	  $20.8	   trillion	  while	  owners’	  equity	  in	  household	  real	  estate	  was	  valued	  at	  $11.25	  trillion.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  such	  locked	  up	  equity	  positions	  have	  not	  been	  used	  as	  an	  economic	  policy	  tool	  to	  speed	   up	   or	   slow	   down	   the	   conversion	   process	   from	   equity	   to	   income	   when	  economic	   circumstances	   require	   such	   actions.	  Neither	  have	   future	   government	  cash	  flows	  been	  used	  as	  an	  economic	  policy	  tool.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-­‐5.pdf	  
	   4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Wealth,	  incomes	  and	  debt:	  the	  blocked	  channels©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  
	  
	  
1	  Economic	  policy	  tools	  	  
1.1	  Current	  tools	  
	  The	   discussion	   about	   economic	   policy	   tools	   is	   usually	   focused	   on	   fiscal	   and	  monetary	  policies.	   The	   fiscal	   policies	   are	   concentrated	  on	   the	  use	   of	   taxes	   and	  the	   levels	   of	   government	   spending.	   The	   main	   aim	   is	   to	   influence	   the	   level	   of	  aggregate	  demand,	   the	   level	  of	  savings	  and	   investments	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  incomes	   over	   the	   various	   income	   groups	   in	   a	   country.	   In	   line	   with	   monetary	  policy	   goals,	   the	   stance	   is	   usually	   described	   as	   neutral,	   expansionary	   or	  contractionary.	  	  Monetary	   policy	   is	   the	   process	   by	   which	   a	   monetary	   authority	   of	   a	   country	  controls	  the	  supply	  of	  money,	  often	  targeting	  an	  inflation	  rate	  or	  interest	  rate	  to	  ensure	   price	   stability	   and	   general	   trust	   in	   the	   currency.	   Further	   goals	   of	   a	  monetary	  policy	   are	  usually	   to	   contribute	   to	   economic	   growth	  and	   stability,	   to	  low	  unemployment,	  and	  to	  predictable	  exchange	  rates	  with	  other	  currencies.	  	  Monetary	   policy	   is	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   either	   being	   neutral,	   expansionary	   or	  contractionary,	   where	   an	   expansionary	   policy	   increases	   the	   total	   supply	   of	  money	   in	   the	   economy	   more	   rapidly	   than	   usual,	   and	   contractionary	   policy	  expands	   the	   money	   supply	   more	   slowly	   than	   usual	   or	   even	   shrinks	   it.	  Expansionary	   policy	   is	   traditionally	   used	   to	   try	   to	   combat	   unemployment	   in	   a	  recession	   by	   lowering	   interest	   rates	   in	   the	   hope	   that	   easy	   credit	   will	   entice	  businesses	  into	  expanding.	  Contractionary	  policy	  is	  intended	  to	  slow	  inflation	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  resulting	  distortions	  and	  deterioration	  of	  asset	  values.	  	  
1.2	  Why	  current	  tools	  have	  been	  ineffective	  
	  
Main	  cause	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
	  What	   started	   already	   in	   1998	   and	   went	   on	   to	   2007	   was	   that	   the	   growth	   in	  incomes	  of	  U.S.	  households	  did	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  increase	  in	  house	  prices.	  The	  latter,	  fuelled	  by	  excessive	  lending	  levels,	  led	  to	  house	  price	  increases	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  incomes’	  growth	  and	  the	  CPI	  index	  developments.	  Based	  on	  population	  growth	  and	  on	  the	  changes	  in	  family	  size	  and	  living	  preferences,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  require	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  per	  annum.	   In	   the	  U.S.,	   contrary	   to	   some	  other	  countries	  like	  the	  U.K.,	  obtaining	  construction	  permits	  is	  generally	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	   process.	   Physical	   supply	   side	   restrictions	   did	   not	   seriously	  influence	   house	   prices.	  What	   caused	   the	   housing	   crisis	   and	   the	   financial	   crisis	  was	   the	   supply	   side	   of	  money	  pumped	   into	   the	  housing	  market,	   especially	   the	  flow	   of	   funds	   to	   those	   unlucky	   enough	   not	   to	   be	   able	   to	   buy	   a	   home	   outright:	  those	  who	  needed	  a	  mortgage	  to	  complete	  their	  home	  acquisition.	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  How	  incomes	  and	  household	  debt	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  can	  best	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  ratio	  and	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  mortgage	  debt	  funds	  over	  house	  building	  and	  house	  price	  inflation:	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  values.	  	  Overfunding	  occurs	  when	  the	  volume	  of	  debt	   increases	   faster	   than	  households’	  income	  growth.	  The	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  ratio	  reflects	  this	  phenomenon.	  Overfunding	  also	   occurs	  when	   higher	   levels	   of	   new	  mortgage	   debts	   result	   not	   only	   in	   new	  homes	  being	  built,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  values	  of	  existing	  homes	  increasing	  faster	  than	  income	   growth	   and	   the	   CPI	   index.	   The	   debt-­‐to-­‐asset	   values	   ratio	   reflects	   the	  latter	   overfunding	   aspect.	   A	   dollar	   in	   new	   savings	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   buying	   a	  home	  is	  depreciated	  in	  value	  compared	  to	  a	  dollar	  saved	  in	  previous	  times.	  	  To	   illustrate	   the	   first	   overfunding	   aspect	   in	   the	   U.S.:	   in	   1997,	   the	   combined	  liabilities	  of	  home	  mortgages	  and	  consumer	  credits	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  disposable	  personal	   income	   stood	   at	   82.9%.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   2006	   this	   percentage	   had	  increased	  to	  123.7%.	  Underfunding	  started	  in	  2008	  and	  per	  the	  end	  of	  2010	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	   ratio	   percentage	   had	   dropped	   to	   111.6%,	   only	   to	   drop	   even	  further	  to	  96.4%	  per	  end	  of	  2014.	  	  Student	  loans	  have	  not	  been	  included.	  	  To	   illustrate	   the	   second	   overfunding	   aspect	   in	   the	   U.S.:	   in	   1998	   16.3%	   of	   the	  increase	   in	   mortgage	   funds	   were	   used	   to	   increase	   house	   prices	   faster	   than	  incomes	   and	   the	   CPI	   index.	   In	   2000	   this	   percentage	   had	   increased	   to	   40%,	   by	  2002	  it	  had	  continued	  its	  increase	  to	  61.6%.	  By	  2004	  it	  had	  further	  increased	  to	  67%;	  by	  2006	  it	  reached	  its	  peak	  of	  68%	  to	  drop	  back	  to	  63.5%	  in	  2007.	  	  The	  overfunding	  period	  lasted	  from	  1998	  to	  2007	  and	  the	  underfunding	  period	  stretched	  out	   from	  2008-­‐2014.	  A	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  about	  overfunding	  and	   underfunding	   can	   be	   found	   in	   a	   paper:	   Overfunding	   and	   underfunding,	   a	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  business	  cycle?2	  	  What	   the	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  ratio	  and	   the	  mortgage	  debt	  allocation	   levels	   show	   is	  that	   a	   ratio	   and	   a	   level	   change	   is	   a	   gradual	   process.	   The	   risks	   taken	   by	   the	  banking	   sector	   (or	   sold	   to	   final	   investors	   in	   mortgage-­‐bonds)	   move	   gradually	  from	   a	   relatively	   low	   risk	   percentage,	   like	   83%	   in	   1997	   to	   a	   very	   high-­‐risk	  scenario,	   like	   in	   2006,	   when	   the	   ratio	   reached	   123.7%.	   The	   chances	   of	   some	  debtors	   not	   being	   able	   to	   fully	   service	   their	   loan	   obligations	   are	  much	   higher	  when	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  income	  is	  needed	  to	  repay	  outstanding	  mortgages.	  When,	  as	  happened	   from	  2004,	   the	  pace	  of	   selling	   sub-­‐prime	  mortgages	  was	   strongly	  accelerated,	   the	   risks	   were	   multiplied	   that	   some	   incomes	   were	   insufficient	   to	  fully	  service	  the	  mortgage	  debt.	  If	  such	  risks,	  like	  American	  banks	  did	  it,	  are	  sold	  to	   non-­‐banks	   that	   have	   no	   obligation	   to	   maintain	   a	   reserve	   ratio,	   any	   non-­‐performance	   of	   a	   cluster	   of	   mortgages	   is	   sufficient	   to	   call	   the	   values	   of	   all	  mortgage	  bonds	  into	  question.	  A	   lack	  of	   liquidity	   in	  a	   financial	  market	  segment	  can	  reverse	  a	  funding	  trend	  very	  quickly.	  Not	  only	  that,	  but	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/62571/	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  also	   hastens	   the	   pace	   to	   get	   doubtful	   debtors	   to	   pay	   up	   or	   lose	   their	   homes	  through	  repossession.	  	  An	   individual	   household	   has	   to	   make	   a	   choice	   in	   which	   year	   to	   take	   up	   a	  mortgage.	   Such	   choice	   is	   firstly	   determined	   by	   how	   much	   the	   household	   has	  saved	  up	  to	  provide	  the	  own	  equity	  element	  for	  the	  purchase.	  Secondly,	  it	  means	  the	  household	  has	  to	  guess	  what	  future	  interest	  rates	  will	  do	  to	  his	  or	  her	  ability	  to	  continue	  to	  service	  the	  mortgage	  debt.	  Thirdly,	  the	  household	  has	  to	  make	  an	  estimate	  of	  what	  they	  believe	  what	  future	  house	  prices	  are	  likely	  to	  be.	  Fourthly,	  a	  household	  has	  to	  guess	  what	  his	  or	  her	  future	  income	  levels	  are	  going	  to	  be	  and	  finally	  a	  household	  is	  in	  an	  impossible	  position	  to	  guess	  what	  the	  overall	  future	  mortgage	  lending	  levels	  are	  going	  to	  be.	  The	  latter	  influence	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  levels	  and	  the	  value	  loss	  to	  a	  dollar	  saved	  to	  buy	  a	  home.	  	  Individual	  households	  have	  to	  weigh	  up	  all	  these	  variables	  at	  the	  time	  when	  they	  want	  to	  acquire	  a	  home.	  The	  act	  of	  buying	  a	  home	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  mortgage	  is	  not	   based	   on	   supply	   and	   demand	   considerations,	   but	   on	   guesses	   about	   future	  variables.	  	  Is	   it	   surprising	   that	   such	   an	   important	   choice	   is	   fraught	   with	   risks	   that	   an	  individual	  household	  cannot	  oversee;	  let	  alone	  manage.	  	  Banks	   can	   and	   do	   know	   how	   the	   macro-­‐economic	   debt-­‐to-­‐income	   levels	   are	  developing	   over	   the	   years.	   However	   is	   any	   bank	   going	   to	   tell	   its	   shareholders	  that	   it	   is	   slowing	   down	   its	  mortgage	   lending	   activities,	   only	   to	   let	   other	   banks	  make	   profits?	   Will	   Fannie	   Mae	   and	   Freddy	   Mac	   be	   doing	   the	   same?	   Unlikely,	  especially	   in	   the	   case	   that	  mortgage	   origination	   can	   be	   offset	   by	   sales	   of	   such	  mortgages	  to	  outside	  investors	  who	  take	  up	  the	  risks.	  	  If	   the	   banks	   cannot	  manage	   themselves	   and	   free	  market	   competition	   does	   not	  stop	  them,	  who	  and	  what	  does?	  	  	  In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  2008,	  this	  should	  have	  been	  the	  question	  that	  U.S.	  banking	  and	  securities	  regulators	  needed	  to	  have	  answered;	  regretfully	  they	  didn’t.	  	  	  
Fiscal	  policies	  	  In	   fiscal	   2007	   the	   total	   level	   of	   revenues	   for	   the	   U.S.	   Federal,	   State	   and	   local	  governments3	  amounted	  to	  $5.170	  trillion.	  This	   level	  dropped	  to	  $4.667	  trillion	  in	   fiscal	   2008	   and	   it	   dropped	   further	   to	   $3.665	   trillion	   in	   fiscal	   2009.	   Tax	  revenues	   showed	   a	   clear	   link	   to	   the	   drop	   in	   incomes	   for	   all	   non-­‐government	  sectors:	  individual	  households,	  businesses	  and	  the	  financial	  sector.	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  In	  2007	  the	  combined	  U.S.	  government	  revenues	  levels	  were	  $5.170	  trillion	  and	  the	  outstanding	  debt	  level	  was	  $11.4	  trillion.	  Debt	  to	  revenues	  level	  was	  219%.	  In	  2009	  the	  revenues	  level	  had	  dropped	  to	  $3.665	  trillion	  and	  the	  debt	  level	  had	  gone	  up	  to	  $14.6	  trillion.	  The	  debt	  to	  revenues	   level	  had	  moved	  up	  to	  398%	  in	  just	  two	  years.	  	  The	   drop	   in	   revenues	   	   (Federal,	   State	   and	   Local)	   was	   $0.5	   trillion	   in	   2008	   as	  compared	  to	  2007	  and	  another	  $1.5	   trillion	   in	  2009	  also	  compared	  to	  2007.	   In	  total	  over	  the	  two	  years	  $2	  trillion.	  The	  outstanding	  debt	  level	  was	  $11.4	  trillion	  in	  2007	  and	  increased	  to	  $14.6	  trillion	  in	  2009;	  a	  $3.2	  trillion	  increase.	  	  The	  Keynesian	  cash	  injection	  amounted	  to	  $1.2	  trillion	  over	  the	  years	  2008	  and	  2009.	  	  This	  was	  over	  and	  above	  the	  level	  of	  maintaining	  government	  expenditure	  at	  the	  2007	  level	  in	  2009.	  	  	  The	  loss	  of	  U.S.	  government	  revenues	  of	  $1.5	  trillion	  in	  2009	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  revenues	   level	   of	   2007	   was	   an	   income	   loss	   to	   government.	   Under	   such	  circumstances	   to	   maintain	   a	   government’s	   expenditure	   level	   with	   the	   help	   of	  borrowed	  funds	  makes	  perfect	  sense.	  However	  did	   it	  make	  sense	  to	  borrow	  an	  additional	  $1.2	  trillion	  for	  influencing	  the	  level	  of	  aggregate	  demand?	  	  In	   the	   paper:	   “Overfunding	   and	   underfunding,	   a	   main	   cause	   of	   the	   business	  cycle?”	  the	  real	  cause	  of	  the	  2007-­‐2008	  crisis	  was	  identified	  that	  mortgage	  debt	  funding	   to	   households	   over	   the	   period	   1998-­‐2007	  was	   not	   only	   used	   to	   build	  more	   homes,	   but	   also	   to	   extensively	   fund	   house	   prices	   to	   increase	   faster	   than	  incomes’	   growth	   and	   the	   CPI	   index.	   Household	   incomes	   had	   been	   put	   under	  severe	   pressure.	   Economic	   imbalances	   were	   created	   in	   the	   household	   debt-­‐to	  income	  and	  debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  values.	  	  In	  2009	  the	  $1.2	  trillion	  was	  not	  channeled	  directly	  to	  households,	  but	  was	  used	  to	   expand	   government	   activities.	   Taking	   on	   even	   more	   debt	   cannot	   solve	   a	  situation	   of	   too	   much	   debt,	   even	   if	   the	   new	   debt	   is	   a	   collective	   one	   and	   the	  existing	  debt	  is	  one	  of	  individual	  households.	  The	  key	  variable	  is	  the	  household	  income	   levels,	   as	   the	   household	   debt	   level	   constitutes	   an	   existing	   fact,	   which	  cannot	   be	   changed.	   Directly	   addressing	   household	   incomes	   levels	   will	   work	  faster	  and	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  indirect	  Keynesian	  cash	  injection.	  	  
Monetary	  policies	  
	  Changes	  in	  interest	  rates	  are	  supposed	  to	  help	  accelerate	  or	  slow	  down	  economic	  growth	   levels.	  Low	   interest	  rates	  are	  supposed	  to	  entice	  households	   to	  borrow	  more	  and	  spend	  more	  and	  higher	  interest	  rates	  to	  slow	  down	  such	  process.	  	  The	   income	   level	   of	   an	   individual	   household	   constitutes	   the	   basis	   for	   any	  borrowings.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   a	   government.	   In	   this	   connection,	   what	   has	  been	  remarkable	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007	  has	  been	  the	  setting	  of	  interest	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  Koning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  rates.	   For	   instance	   in	   2001	   on	   basis	   of	   the	   funds	   supplied	   as	   home	  mortgages	  ($509	  billion)	  the	  number	  of	  homes	  which	  could	  have	  been	  built	  if	  house	  prices	  had	  moved	  up	   in	   line	  with	   the	  CPI	   index	  since	  1997,	  was	  3.161	  million	  homes.	  The	  actual	  number	  of	  housing	  starts	  in	  2001	  was	  barely	  half	  this4.	  In	  2001	  about	  half	   of	   the	   funds	   in	   money	   supplied	   as	   home	   mortgages	   were	   used	   to	   create	  house	   price	   inflation	   over	   the	   CPI	   level	   and	   not	   for	   new	   housing	   starts.	  Overfunding	  was	  taking	  place	  and	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  Fed	  was	  to	  lower	  the	  Fed	  funds	   rate	   from	  over	  6%	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   2001	   to	  1.75%	   in	  2002.	  As	   could	  have	  been	  expected,	   rather	   than	   slowing	  down	   the	  overfunding	   trend,	   an	  even	  stronger	  overfunding	  level	  followed	  the	  rapid	  lowering	  of	  the	  Fed	  funds	  rate.	  In	  2004	  68%	  of	  all	  new	  home	  mortgage	  borrowings	  were	  not	  spent	  on	  new	  home	  building,	  but	  on	  forcing	  house	  prices	  up	  above	  the	  CPI	  levels.	  	  The	   household	   debt-­‐to-­‐income	   levels	   deteriorated	   continuously	   from	   1998-­‐2006.	  From	  an	  overfunding	  perspective,	  a	  policy	  of	  maintaining	  interest	  rates	  at	  about	   6%	   during	   the	   period	   2002-­‐2006	  would	   have	   been	   preferable	   over	   the	  lowering	  of	  interest	  rates	  to	  1.75%	  or	  even	  1.0%	  as	  was	  done	  in	  2004.	  The	  risks	  to	   U.S.	   households	   were	   contained	   in	   the	   use	   of	   borrowed	   funds	   and	   in	   the	  allocation	   of	   funds	   to	   stimulate	   house	   price	   inflation	   rates	   far	   in	   excess	   of	   CPI	  inflation	  levels	  and	  household	  incomes.	  Lowering	  interest	  rates	  were	  conducive	  to	  stimulating	  such	  overfunding	  levels.	  	  The	  current	  Fed	   funds	  rate	  of	  0.25%,	  which	  has	  been	   the	  rate	  since	  November	  2008,	  has	  not	  been	  conducive	  to	  stimulate	  mortgage	  borrowings	  by	  households	  over	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2014.	  Ever	  since	  2008	  individual	  households	  have	  repaid	  about	  $1.2	  trillion	  of	  the	  total	  mortgage	  debt	  levels	  of	  $10.5	  trillion	  in	  2007.	  The	  lowest	  interest	  rates	  on	  record	  did	  not	  turn	  around	  the	  underfunding	  level.	  What	  did	  turn	  the	  economy	  around	  was	  the	  improvement	  in	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  levels.	  Individual	   households	   achieved	   the	   latter	   improvement	   by	   saving	   more	   from	  income	  levels	  to	  reduce	  outstanding	  debt	  levels.	  	  The	   conclusion	   out	   of	   the	   above	   is	   that	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   the	   Fed’s	  interest	   rate	   policy	   as	   applied	   from	   2002-­‐2014	   initially	   strengthened	   the	  overfunding	  process	  from	  2002	  to	  2005,	  when	  Fed	  funds	  rates	  were	  kept	  below	  or	  at	  2%.	  Subsequently	   from	  January	  2005	  to	   July	  2006	  the	  rate	  was	   increased	  from	  2.25%	  to	  5.25%,	  to	  stay	  at	  this	  level	  to	  September	  2007.	  The	  main	  push	  into	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgages	  started	  in	  2004.	  Many	  of	  these	  mortgages	  had	  a	  two-­‐year	  period	  of	  below	  market	   interest	  rates.	   	  Mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  contained	  a	  sizeable	   share	  of	   sub-­‐prime	  mortgages.	  These	   sub-­‐prime	  mortgage	  holders	  did	  not	   expect	   the	  move	  up	   in	   interest	   rates	   in	   2006,	  which	   increased	   the	   level	   of	  doubtful	  debtors	  substantially.	  Such	  non-­‐performing	  mortgages	  in	  the	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   were	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   liquidity	   crisis	   in	   these	   securities,	  which	  happened	  in	  August	  2007.	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  The	   interest	   rate	   policy	   as	   applied	   from	   2002	   to	   2005	   did	   not	   address	   the	  overfunding	  trend,	  but	  rather	  strengthened	  the	  process.	  When	  the	  Fed	  did	  start	  to	   raise	   interest	   rates	   from	   January	  2005,	   it	  did	  not	   fully	   take	   into	  account	   the	  potential	   level	  of	  doubtful	  debtors	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  change	  might	  bring	  about.	  Its	   reversal	   of	   policy	   from	   September	   2007	   did	   not	   benefit	   most	   existing	  mortgage	   holders.	   	   In	   2008	   the	   liquidity	   crisis	   in	   mortgage	   bonds	   affected	  financial	   institutions,	   the	   equity	   markets	   and	   the	   job	   markets.	   Households’	  income	   levels	   came	   under	   severe	   pressure	   through	   rapidly	   increasing	  unemployment	  levels	  and	  a	  wages	  growth	  pattern	  below	  CPI	  inflation	  levels.	  	  The	  Fed’s	   role	   in	   liquidity	  support	   for	  banks	  and	  other	   financial	   institutions	  as	  well	  as	  borrowers	  and	  investors	  in	  key	  credit	  markets	  worked	  well.	  	  In	   October	   2008	   the	   Fed	   started	   with	   a	   program	   of	   Quantitative	   Easing.	   This	  program	  was	  directed	  at	  mortgage	  bonds	  and	  government	  treasuries.	   	  QE1	  was	  followed	   by	   QE2	   and	   QE3.	   These	   programs	   helped	   to	   lower	   the	   long-­‐term	  interest	  rates.	  It	  also	  helped	  share	  prices	  to	  recover.	  	  By	  2008,	  what	  these	  programs	  did	  not	  do	  was	  to	  provide	  short-­‐term	  liquidity	  to	  help	   all	   individual	   households.	   The	   overfunding	   process	   had	   been	   left	  uncorrected.	  By	  2007,	  the	  mortgage	  debt	  level	  was	  fixed	  by	  and	  the	  only	  variable	  to	   improve	   the	   debt-­‐to-­‐income	   level	   could	   have	   been	   to	   influence	   the	   level	   of	  household	   incomes.	   There	   are	   three	   ways	   to	   do	   this:	   The	   Economic	   Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  and	  the	  unblocking	  of	  savings	  in	  pensions	  and	  in	  home	  equity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.	  	  The	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  	  From	  the	  start	  of	  2008,	  the	  readjustment	  period	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  has	  taken	  well	   over	   6	   years.	   The	   financial	   crisis	   had	   affected	   the	   whole	   economy:	  companies,	   individual	   households	   and	   the	   Government’s	   finances.	   A	   finance-­‐induced	  crisis	  needs	  a	  finance-­‐induced	  answer.	  	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  did	  save	  the	  banks,	  apart	  from	  one.	  It	  did	  save	  the	  financial	  markets	  from	  collapse.	  It	  did	  lower	  short	  and	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  and	  it	  did	  monetize	  $2.461	  trillion	  of	  government	  debt	  and	  $1.737	  trillion	  in	  mortgage	  debt	  as	  per	  its	  balance	  sheet	  of	  31	  December	  2014.5	  	  	  The	   real	   question	   is:	   Would	   it	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   shorten	   the	   adjustment	  period?	  	  The	   key	   consideration	   could	   have	   been	   to	   shift	   the	   attention	   away	   from	  institutional	   support	   –support	   of	   the	   banks	   and	   the	   financial	   system-­‐	   to	   some	  form	   of	   support	   for	   individual	   households.	   More	   of	   the	   latter	   would	   have	  reduced	  the	  need	  for	  the	  former.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm	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  Wealth,	  incomes	  and	  debt:	  the	  blocked	  channels©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  In	   2007	   the	   average	  median	   household	   income	  was	   $50,740.6.	   The	   number	   of	  individual	   households	   was	   116	   783	   000.7	  If	   in	   2008,	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   had	  decided,	  with	  approval	  from	  the	  Houses	  of	  Congress,	  to	  advance	  tax	  free	  4%	  or	  $2030	   to	   every	   individual	   household,	   the	   total	   bill	   would	   have	   come	   to	   $237	  billion.	   If	   in	  2009	  3%	  had	  been	  advanced	   the	  bill	  would	  have	  been	  about	  $180	  billion	  and	  for	  2010	  2%	  with	  a	  bill	  of	  $130	  billion;	  in	  total	  $547	  billion.	  For	  the	  lowest	  fifth	  income	  group	  this	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  income	  increase	  of	  11.47%	  over	   their	   average	   household	   income	   of	   $17,700.	   For	   the	   second	   fifth	  with	   an	  average	   income	  of	  $38,000	   it	  would	  have	  meant	  an	   income	   injection	  of	  5.34%.	  For	   the	   third	   fifth	   it	  meant	   an	   injection	   of	   3.67%	  over	   their	  median	   income	  of	  $55,300;	   for	   the	   fourth	   fifth	   a	   2.61%	   injection	   and	   for	   the	   top	   fifth	   a	   1.02%	  injection.	  	  In	   summary,	   the	   2008	   cash	   injection	   would	   have	   implied	   a	   1.61%	   growth	  incentive,	   as	   the	   GDP	   for	   the	   year	   was	   $14.72	   trillion.	   The	   consumption	  multiplier	   would	   have	  most	   likely	  made	   the	   result	   even	  more	   significant.	   The	  cash	   injection	  would	  have	   caused	   less	   stress	   to	   the	  banking	   sector,	   so	   that	   the	  banks	  would	   have	   been	   able	   to	   fund	   the	   business	   sector	   better.	   It	   would	   also	  have	  reduced	  the	  government’s	  deficit,	  as	  more	  tax	  would	  have	  been	  due	  from	  a	  higher	  economic	  growth	  rate.	  	  	  The	  EGIM	  cash	  injection	  would	  have	  helped	  the	  lowest	  income	  classes	  the	  most.	  These	  classes	  are	  also	  the	  most	   likely	  groups	  to	  have	  needed	  a	  mortgage	  to	  get	  on	   the	   property	   ladder.	   Such	   groups	   would	   also	   be	   the	   ones	   with	   the	   lowest	  levels	  of	  savings	  and	  thereby	  excluded	  from	  the	  benefits	  of	  quantitative	  easing:	  the	  rise	   in	  share	  prices	  and	   the	  appreciation	  of	  bond	  prices.	  The	  EGIM	  method	  helps	  to	  correct	  the	  inequality	  in	  income	  growth	  that	  the	  QE	  process	  through	  its	  effects	  does	  strengthen.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  would	  have	  had	  on	  its	  books	  would	  not	  be	  a	  claim	   on	   individual	   households,	   but	   on	   the	   whole	   economy,	   represented	   by	  future	   government	   revenues.	   Instead	   of	   spending	   a	   full	   $2.4	   trillion	   on	   past	  government	   debt	   through	   Quantitative	   Easing,	   about	   $550	   billion	   could	   have	  been	   spent	   on	   basis	   of	   future	   government	   cash-­‐in	   flows.	   In	   other	   words	   the	  Houses	   of	   Congress	   could	   have	   authorized	   that	   the	   Fed	   could	   reclaim	   the	  individual	   household	   cash	   injection	   from	   future	   government	   revenues	   over	   a	  period	  of	  say	  ten	  years.	  	  Some	   of	   the	   cash	   provided	   to	   individual	   households	  would	   have	   been	   used	   to	  service	   outstanding	  mortgages.	   The	   result	   would	   have	   been	   fewer	   foreclosure	  proceedings	   and	   less	   home	   repossessions.	   It	   would	   also	   have	   meant	   that	   the	  affected	   households	   would	   have	   more	   funds	   to	   spend	   on	   other	   goods	   and	  services.	  The	  households	  not	  affected	  by	  mortgage	  repayments	  would	  also	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/acs-­‐09.pdf	  7	  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-­‐235.pdf	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  Wealth,	  incomes	  and	  debt:	  the	  blocked	  channels©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  had	  more	  money	  to	  spend	  on	  goods	  and	  services.	  A	  campaign	  to	  encourage	  the	  population	   to	  use	   the	   funds	   for	   “economic	   stimulus”	   consumption	   should	  have	  convinced	  most	  households	  to	  follow	  suit.	  	  The	  above	  use	  of	  a	  4,	  3	  and	  2%	  was	  only	  to	  illustrate	  how	  an	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  could	  work.	  If	  the	  EGIM	  system	  would	  be	  used,	  it	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  prerogative	  of	   the	   legislature	   together	  with	   the	  Central	  bank	   to	   choose	   the	  appropriate	   level	   of	   cash	   advance	   for	   all	   individual	   households	   or	   for	   specific	  income	  categories.	  	  
3.	  The	  unblocking	  of	  pension	  savings	  
	  Pension	  savings	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  elsewhere	  have	  grown	  into	  a	  wealth	  element	  of	  considerable	  size.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2014,	  pension	  savings	  represented	  25.1%	  of	  the	  total	   net	   worth	   of	   U.S.	   individual	   households.	   To	   put	   this	   in	   perspective,	   U.S.	  pension	  savings	  are	  now	  at	  a	  level	  equaling	  1.175	  times	  the	  nominal	  U.S.	  GDP	  of	  2014,	  which	  was	  $17.7	  trillion.	  	  In	  all	  countries	  where	  pension	  savings	  exceed	  or	  are	  close	  to	  the	  GDP	  level,	  like	  the	  U.K.	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  for	  instance,	  questions	  have	  been	  raised	  about	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  locking	  in	  such	  large	  sums	  of	  savings	  without	  allowing	  some	  access	   at	   times	   of	   need.	   The	   U.K.	   has	   already	   gone	   the	   furthest.	   From	  April	   6,	  2015	   U.K.	   pension	   savers	   can	   access	   their	   pension	   pots	   in	   cash	   rather	   than	  buying	  an	  income	  for	  life:	  the	  annuity	  route.	  Individuals	  can	  use	  their	  pension	  as	  a	  bank	  account,	  getting	  25%	  of	  the	  money	  tax-­‐free	  each	  time	  one	  takes	  cash	  out.	  Or	  the	  pension	  saver	  can	  take	  25%	  in	  one	  lump	  sum	  and	  use	  the	  rest	  as	  a	  bank	  account.	   Pension	   pots	   can	   be	   transferred	   to	   relatives,	   often	   tax-­‐free.	   Plans	   are	  underway	   to	   make	   annuities	   saleable,	   so	   that	   individuals	   can	   determine	   their	  need	  for	  cash	  more	  freely.	  	  The	   U.K.	   system	   changes	   represent	   a	   pension	   revolution	   from	   going	   to	   total	  inaccessibility	  to	  substantial	  access	  in	  one	  go.	  However	  for	  the	  under	  55s	  and	  for	  those	   in	   a	   Defined	   Benefit	   scheme	   who	   have	   started	   to	   withdraw,	   the	   lock	  remains	  in	  place.	  	  The	  drawback	  of	  the	  U.K.	  system	  is	  that	  it	  makes	  individuals	  fully	  responsible	  for	  guessing	  their	  personal	   longevity	  and	  future	   inflation	   levels.	  When	  a	  mistake	   is	  made	  and	  the	  individual	  lives	  longer	  than	  guessed	  or	  inflation	  levels	  are	  higher	  than	  expected,	  he	  or	  she	  might	  end	  up	  in	  penury	  in	  old	  age.	  The	  second	  blockage	  in	  the	  U.K.	  system	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  age	  level	  of	  55.	  	  	  The	  proposal	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  promote	  access	  to	  pension	  savings	  linked	  to	  the	  state	   of	   an	   economy,	   including	   the	   state	   of	   the	   personal	   economy	   of	   different	  income	   classes.	   An	   age	   limit	   would	   not	   be	   recommended	   as	   especially	   the	  younger	  savers	  might	  wish	  to	  have	  access	  when	  economic	  times	  are	  tough.	  The	  second	  consideration	   is	   to	   limit	   the	  overall	  withdrawal	   level	  and	  only	  open	  the	  opportunity	  for	  withdrawal	  again	  when	  economic	  times	  need	  it.	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  Wealth,	  incomes	  and	  debt:	  the	  blocked	  channels©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2007	  the	  pension	  savings	  level	  stood	  at	  $13.4	  trillion.	  Per	  the	  end	  of	  2014	  this	  savings	  level	  had	  risen	  to	  $20.8	  trillion.	  	  The	  U.S.	  retirement	  savings	  system	  consists	  of	  four	  elements:	  	  
• The	  employer	  sponsored	  Defined	  Benefit	  (DB)	  plans	  	  
• The	  Defined	  Contribution	  (DC)	  plans	  	  
• The	  Individual	  Retirement	  Accounts	  (IRA)	  and	  upon	  retirement	  	  
• The	  Annuity	  plans.	  	   	  As	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   in	   2008,	  many	   companies	   had	   a	   fresh	  look	  at	  the	  risks	  that	  their	  company’s	  DB	  plan	  constituted	  to	  the	  profit	  and	  loss	  accounts.	   A	   large	   number	   of	   these	   companies	   decided	   that	   such	   exposure	  was	  unacceptable	   and	   opted	   for	   supporting	   a	   shift	   to	   DC	   plans.	   The	   latter	   plans	  transfer	   all	   the	   investment	   risks	   to	   the	   individual,	   but	   are	   still	   supported	   by	  contributions	   from	   the	   employer’s	   side.	   	   In	   the	   IRA’s,	   the	   pension	   savers	   also	  carry	  the	  full	  investment	  risks.	  	  In	  2012	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  total	  retirement	  savings	  system	  was	  that	  38.2%	  was	   represented	   by	  DB	   plans,	   28.2%	   in	   IRA’s,	   26.5%	   in	  DC	   plans	   and	   7.1%	   in	  Annuities.	  	  In	   many	   cases,	   apart	   from	   the	   Roth	   IRA	   schemes,	   pension	   contributions	   are,	  subject	  to	  some	  limits,	  tax	  deductible	  when	  the	  savings	  are	  made	  and	  tax	  liable	  when	  savings	  are	  withdrawn.	  The	  official	  retirement	  age	  in	  the	  U.S.	  for	  pension	  savings	  purposes	  is	  70	  ½	  years.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  impact	  on	  taxes	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  deferring	  the	  tax	  liability	  on	  pension	  savings	  represents	  about	  0.8%	  of	  GDP.	  	  The	   proposal	   for	   a	   new	   economic	   policy	   tool	   is	   to	   make	   pension	   savings	  accessible,	  as	  and	  when	  needed,	  for	  counteracting	  an	  unacceptable	  deterioration	  in	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  and	  debt-­‐to-­‐home	  values	  situation.	  	  	  The	   first	  question	   is	   for	  whom	   is	   this	   important.	  Young	  people	  aspiring	  or	   just	  starting	   to	  become	  homeowners;	   young	  and	   thereby	  often	   lower	  paid	  workers	  and	   the	   lower	   and	  middle	   class	   employees,	   they	   can	   all	   collectively	   incur	   debt	  levels	   that	   may	   constitute	   a	   threat	   to	   economic	   growth	   levels.	   None	   of	   them	  decide	   individually	   about	   the	   collective	   debt	   levels.	   Overfunding	   and	   the	  subsequent	   underfunding	   periods	   are	   not	   of	   their	   making.	   However	   these	  overfunding	   periods	   are	   very	   detrimental	   to	   household	   incomes	   and	   to	   the	  values	  of	  their	  savings	  levels.	  The	  economic	  facts	  of	  2008	  speak	  for	  themselves.	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  To	  correct	   the	  overfunding	  excess,	  which	   leaves	   individual	  households	  under	  a	  great	  stress	   to	  pay	  back	  their	  mortgage	  and	  consumer	  debt,	  a	  scheme	  could	  be	  developed	   which	   helps	   them	   to	   use	   some	   of	   the	   existing	   savings	   in	   pension	  arrangements.	  	  To	  start	  with	   the	  macro	  details	   first:	  Over	   the	   last	   four	  years	  2011-­‐2014	  about	  $1trillion	  was	   added	   to	   pension	   savings	   every	   year.	   For	   the	   case	   of	   simplicity:	  assume	   the	   total	   mortgage	   debt	   is	   $10	   trillion	   with	   an	   average	   remaining	  maturity	  of	  15	  years	  and	  equal	  annual	  installments	  of	  $667	  billion	  plus	  interest	  of	   say	   3.5%	   per	   annum	   which	   implies	   $350	   billion:	   a	   total	   sum	   of	   about	   $1	  trillion.	  Assume	  further	  more	  that,	  like	  in	  2008,	  about	  half	  of	  this	  amount	  could	  have	  been	  repaid	  from	  household	  incomes;	  this	  left	  a	  gap	  of	  $500	  billion.	  	  About	  $200	  billion	  could	  be	  covered	  through	  the	  EGIM	  method;	  returning	  about	  1/5th	  of	  the	  annual	  pension	  savings	  could	  deliver	  about	  $200	  billion	  and	  about	  $100	  billion	  could	  be	  withdrawn	  out	  the	  home	  equity	  transfer	  scheme	  as	  will	  be	  described	  the	  next	  section.	  	  For	  the	  collective	  DB	  schemes	  	  –provided	  that	  all	  schemes	  grow	  in	  line	  with	  their	  respective	  market	  size-­‐	  38.2%	  of	  the	  $200	  billion	  of	  the	  needed	  cash	  injection	  or	  about	  $76	  billion	  would	  need	  to	  come	  from	  these	  schemes.	  This	  represents	  about	  20%	  of	  the	  annual	  DB	  pension	  inflows.	  	  For	   DC	   schemes	   and	   IRA	   facilities	   they	   collectively	   need	   to	   make	   up	   the	  remainder	  $124	  billion.	  	  	  Depending	  on	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  urgency	  of	   the	  overfunding	   situation	  and	   the	  expected	  risks	  to	  the	  income	  levels	  of	  individual	  households,	  especially	  the	  ones	  with	  the	  highest	  relative	  debt	  levels	  (debt-­‐to	  income	  levels),	  the	  U.S.	  government	  may	   consider	   to	   stimulate	   that	   DB,	   DC	   and	   IRA	   facilities	   may	   be	   used	   to	  withdraw	   funds	   to	   the	   extent	   as	   described	   above.	   Such	   withdrawal	   may	   be	  provided	  tax	  free	  to	  encourage	  pension	  savers	  to	  use	  the	  temporary	  withdrawal	  option.	  The	  option	  should	  be	  open	  to	  all	  pension	  savers	   in	  all	   forms	  of	  pension	  savings.	  The	  option	  period	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  short	  period,	  say	  two	  months.	  After	   two	  months	   the	  option	  will	  be	  exercised	   for	  all	   those	  who	  have	  accepted	  the	  offer.	  The	  payout	  would	  be	  for	  DB	  schemes	  the	  $76	  billion	  needed,	  however	  no	   pension	   saver	   should	   claim	  more	   than	   the	   funds	   in	   their	   pension	   pot.	   For	  other	  schemes	  the	  system	  would	  work	  in	  the	  same	  manner.	  	  The	  benefits	  of	   the	  scheme	  are	  the	  same	  as	   for	   the	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method.	   The	   debt-­‐to-­‐income	   ratio	   correction	   can	   be	   applied	  when	   debts	   grow	  much	   faster	   than	   incomes.	   At	   the	   danger	   point,	   debts	   are	   fixed,	   so	   the	   only	  variable	  is	  to	  adjust	  incomes.	  The	  short	  term	  unblocking	  of	  pension	  savings	  is	  a	  possible	   alternative.	   Such	   unblocking	   provides	   cash	   to	   all	   savers	  who	  want	   or	  need	   to	   replenish	   their	   current	   income	   with	   an	   additional	   amount.	   Doubtful	  debtor	  levels	  will	  be	  less;	  economic	  growth	  will	  get	  an	  impulse	  and	  government	  borrowing	  needs	  to	  be	  less,	  as	  the	  economy	  will	  be	  performing	  better.	  The	  values	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  of	  the	  pension	  pot	  should	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  very	  much	  as	  share	  prices	  are	  likely	  to	   perform	   better,	   when	   economic	   growth	   drops	   less	   than	   the	   experience	   of	  2008.	  	  	  
4.	  The	  unblocking	  of	  home	  equity	  
	  The	  $11.3	  trillion	  of	  owner’s	  equity	  in	  household	  real	  estate	  constitutes	  the	  most	  illiquid	  of	  all	   assets	  households	  own.	   It	   is	   the	  ambition	  of	  many	   to	   live	   in	   their	  own	   home.	   The	   overfunding	   period	   has	   made	   this	   a	   distant	   dream	   for	   many	  young	   households.	   Due	   to	   overfunding	   in	   the	   period	   up	   to	   2008,	   5.8	   million	  households	   lost	   their	   home	   through	   repossession	   during	   the	   underfunding	  period.	  	  The	  overfunding	  symptoms	  were	  not	  corrected	  when	   they	  happened.	  However	  for	   future	   use	   it	  would	   be	   helpful	   if	   home	   equity	   could	   be	  made	   liquid	   as	   and	  when	  required	  for	  combatting	  the	  effects	  of	  underfunding.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mainly	   life	   insurers	  have	  practiced	   the	   current	  method	  of	   turning	  home	  equity	  into	   cash.	   They	   offer	   home	   equity	   release	   schemes,	   based	   on	   life	   expectancy	  tables.	  Such	  cash	  is	  advanced	  at	  borrowed	  rates	  well	  above	  long	  term	  ones	  as	  the	  repayment	  of	  the	  debt	  depends	  on	  life	  expectancy	  of	  the	  homeowner	  and	  on	  the	  future	  sales	  price	  of	  the	  home	  once	  the	  owner	  has	  died.	  	  	  For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  this	  system	  is	  unsuitable	  for	  anyone	  below	  65	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  it	  are	  relatively	  high.	  	  	  Therefore	   the	  proposal	   is	   to	  set	  up	  a	  government	  owned	  housing	   institute	   that	  manages	   part	   ownership.	   The	   reason	   is	   that	  withdrawal	   of	   liquidity	   out	   of	   the	  owner	   occupied	   homes	   should	   be	   part	   of	   the	   set	   of	   economic	   policy	   tools	   to	  combat	  underfunding.	  	  Such	  home	  equity	  liquidity	  scheme	  could	  work	  as	  follows:	  	  Application	  of	  the	  scheme	  is	  based	  on	  the	  necessity	  to	  improve	  income	  levels	  at	  a	  specific	  moment	  in	  time,	  to	  be	  judged	  by	  government	  to	  correct	  an	  overfunding	  situation.	   It	   should	  be	   a	   temporary	  measure	   only,	   to	   be	   repeated	   as	   and	  when	  needed.	  	  It	  could	  apply	  to	  all	  owner	  occupied	  homeowners	  with	  a	  mortgage	  outstanding.	  They	   could	   be	   offered	   the	   opportunity	   to	   swap	   a	   small	   percentage	   of	   their	  ownership	   to	   a	   government	   owned	   housing	   institute.	   The	   government	   would	  become	  co-­‐owner	  with	  the	  private	  household.	  The	  Fed	  could	  provide	  the	  cash	  to	  the	   owner	   via	   the	   government	   institute.	   The	   homeowner	   would	   remain	  responsible	  for	  maintaining	  the	  property.	  In	  return	  for	  the	  cash,	  the	  home	  owner	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  could	  be	  liable	  in	  future	  years	  to	  pay	  local	  government	  a	  fixed	  “rent”	  of	  3%	  of	  the	  amount	  outstanding,	  starting	  from	  the	  year	  after	  the	  cash	  withdrawal.	  	  	  The	  part	  ownership	  is	  transferable	  to	  new	  properties	  if	  the	  homeowner	  wants	  to	  move.	   	   If	  the	  part	  ownership	  scheme	  had	  to	  be	  applied	  at	  several	  occasions	  the	  government	  ownership	  share	  should	  not	  exceed	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  property	  value	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  transaction.	  	  	  Upon	  the	  death	  of	  the	  owner(s),	  the	  inheritors	  are	  liable	  to	  repay	  the	  outstanding	  government	  share	  of	  the	  property	  value	  back	  to	  the	  government	  institute	  for	  the	  funds	   to	   be	   returned	   to	   the	   Fed.	   Valuation	   of	   the	   government	   share	   could	   be	  based	  on	  the	  market	  value	  of	  the	  house	  at	  the	  time	  of	  sale.	  	  If,	   in	   better	   times,	   the	   owner	   would	   like	   to	   repurchase	   his	   or	   her	   sold	   home-­‐	  equity	   share,	   the	   costs	   of	   it	   should	   be	   fixed	   at	   the	   original	   amount	   plus	   an	  interest	  rate	  equal	  to	  the	  long	  term	  borrowing	  rate	  for	  the	  government.	  However	  the	  “rent”	  costs	  need	  to	  be	  deducted	  from	  these	  interest	  charges.	  	  The	   proposal	   represents	   a	  macro-­‐economic	  management	   tool;	   hence	   it	   cannot	  operate	   in	   the	   private	   sector.	   The	   funding	  mechanism	   is	   equal	   to	   Quantitative	  Easing	  with	   the	  difference	  that	   the	  debt	   is	  not	  government	  debt,	  but	   individual	  household	  debt	  based	  on	  property	  values.	  	  	  
	  
5.	  Some	  conclusions	  
	  
• Economic	   growth	   rates	   are	   based	   on	   the	   use	   of	   incomes	   for	  consumption	  and	  on	  the	  use	  of	  savings	  for	  assisting	  households	  in	  their	  operations.	  Companies	  use	  savings	   to	   fund	  their	  operations.	  The	   conversion	   of	   savings	   into	   debts	   helps	   governments	   and	  individual	  households	  to	  spend	  more	  than	  their	  incomes.	  	  
• The	  conversion	  rate	  of	  savings	  into	  debts	  varies	  over	  time.	  	  
• For	  individual	  households	  and	  governments	  the	  key	  variables	  are	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  and	  debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  values	  ratios.	  	  	  
• When	   incomes	   grow	   less	   rapidly	   than	   debts,	   a	   period	   of	  overfunding	  starts;	  when	  debts	  are	  reduced	  compared	  to	  incomes	  an	  underfunding	  period	  occurs.	  Both	  are	  elements	  of	  the	  business	  cycle.	  	  
• Economic	  growth	   levels	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	   incomes	  and	  debt	  based	  growth	  levels.	  Hence	  the	  necessity	  to	  monitor	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	  and	  debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  values	  developments.	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• Monitoring	  in	  its	  own	  right	  is	  not	  sufficient	  if	  no	  action	  is	  taken	  to	  counteract	  overfunding	  or	  underfunding.	  	  
• In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  policy	  actions	  taken	  during	  the	  overfunding	  period	  from	  1998-­‐2007	   included	  the	  use	  of	   the	   interest	  rate	   instrument.	  Regretfully	   the	   lowering	   of	   the	   Fed	   funds	   rate	   from	   over	   6%	   in	  2000	   to	   1%	   in	   2004	   only	   enhanced	   the	   overfunding	   trend.	   The	  subsequent	   increase	   to	   5.25%	   in	   July	   2006,	   which	   lasted	   to	  September	  2007,	  took	  too	  little	  notice	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  many	  of	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgage	  holders.	  Many	  of	  the	  latter	  had	  a	  below	  market	   interest	   rate	   for	   the	   first	   two	   years,	   after	   which	   a	   new	  market	   rate	   was	   applied.	   The	   inclusion	   of	   such	   mortgages	   in	  mortgage	   bonds	   made	   these	   bonds	   vulnerable	   to	   defaults.	  Liquidity	  for	  such	  bonds	  dried	  up	  in	  September	  2007.	  	   	  
• In	  the	  underfunding	  period	  2008-­‐2014,	  the	  historically	  lowest	  Fed	  funds	   rate	   of	   0.25%	   did	   not	   induce	   individual	   households	   to	  borrow	   more	   for	   mortgage	   funding,	   rather	   the	   opposite.	   From	  2008-­‐2014	   households	   paid	   back	   $1.2	   trillion	   from	   their	  outstanding	  mortgage	  amounts.	  They	  did	  this	  out	  of	  their	  incomes	  rather	  than	  by	  refinancing.	  	  
• In	   the	  U.S.	   the	  deterioration	   in	   the	  debt-­‐to-­‐income	   levels	   and	   the	  debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  values	  was	  not	  stopped	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007.	  This	  left	  the	  debt	  levels	  fixed.	  The	  only	  sensible	  policy	  tools	  would	  have	   been	   to	   influence	   the	   income	   levels.	   This	   paper	   has	   set	   out	  three	   possible	   economic	   tools:	   the	   Economic	   Growth	   Incentive	  Method,	   the	   unblocking	   of	   a	   small	   part	   of	   pension	   funds	   savings	  and	  the	  unblocking	  of	  home	  equity	  	  
• Quantitative	   Easing	   and	   Keynesian	   induced	   government	  borrowings	  have	  not	  been	  included	  as	  neither	  of	  such	  policy	  tools	  focus	  directly	  on	  individual	  households	  and	  their	  debt	  positions.	  It	  was	   not	   the	   “money	   supply”	   but	   the	   “money	   supplied”	   to	  individual	  households	  that	  caused	  the	  crisis	  in	  2007-­‐2008	  	  
• Prevention	   of	   overfunding	   would	   have	   been	   desirable,	   but	  solutions	   to	   prevent	   underfunding	   causing	   such	   damage	   to	  incomes,	  employment	  and	  wealth	  levels	  need	  to	  be	  in	  place	  when	  the	  next	  economic	  business	  cycle	  occurs	  again.	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  Kees	  De	  Koning	  Chorleywood	  U.K.	  5th	  April	  2015	  	  
	   17	  




	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis,	  B100	  and	  B101	  Balance	  Sheet	  of	  Households	  and	  Non-­‐profit	  Organizations,	  	  	  	  	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/accessible/b100.htm	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-­‐5.pdf;	  	  Kees	   De	   Koning:	   Overfunding	   and	   underfunding,	   a	  main	   cause	   of	   the	   business	  cycle?	  	  5th	  March	  2015,	  MPRA;	  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/62571/	  	  Executive	  Office	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Washington	  D.C.	  	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  Table	  2.1	  Federal	  Receipts	  by	  source	  1934-­‐2016,	  	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  Washington	  D.C.	   	   Jeffrey	  L.	  Barnet	  and	  others,	  2012	  Census	  of	   Government:	   State	   and	   Local	   Government	   Summary	   Report	   December	   17,	  2014,	  http://www2.census.gov/govs/local/summary_report.pdf	  	  Board	  of	  Governors	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System,	  Washington	  D.C.,	  Quarterly	  Report	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Balance	  Sheet	  Developments	  March	  2015,	  www.federalreserve.gov/files/quarterly_balance_sheet_developments_report_201503.pdf	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   18	  
	  	  	  
